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Abstract
Quantifying how many people are or will be sick, and where, is a critical
ingredient in reducing the burden of disease because it helps the public
health system plan and implement effective outbreak response. This pro-
cess of disease surveillance is currently based on data gathering using
clinical and laboratory methods; this distributed human contact and re-
sulting bureaucratic data aggregation yield expensive procedures that lag
real time by weeks or months. The promise of new surveillance approaches
using internet data, such as web event logs or social media messages, is
to achieve the same goal but faster and cheaper. However, prior work in
this area lacks a rigorous model of information flow, making it difficult to
assess the reliability of both specific approaches and the body of work as
a whole.
We model disease surveillance as a Shannon communication. This
new framework lets any two disease surveillance approaches be compared
using a unified vocabulary and conceptual model. Using it, we describe
and compare the deficiencies suffered by traditional and internet-based
surveillance, introduce a new risk metric called deceptiveness, and offer
mitigations for some of these deficiencies. This framework also makes the
rich tools of information theory applicable to disease surveillance. This
better understanding will improve the decision-making of public health
practitioners by helping to leverage internet-based surveillance in a way
complementary to the strengths of traditional surveillance.
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1 Introduction
Despite advances in medicine and public health, infectious disease still causes
substantial morbidity and mortality [28]. Disease surveillance provides the data
required to combat disease by identifying new outbreaks, monitoring ongoing
outbreaks, and forecasting future outbreaks [21]. However, traditional surveil-
lance relies on in-person data gathering for clinical evaluations and laboratory
tests, making it costly, difficult, and slow to cover the necessary large geographic
areas and population. Disease surveillance using internet data promises to reach
the same goals faster and at lower cost.
This promise depends on two things being true: (1) people leave traces of their
own and others’ health status online and (2) these traces can be extracted and
used to accurately estimate disease incidence. Traces include search queries [16],
social media messages [8], reference work usage [13], and blog posts [7].1
The first claim is compelling, but the second is more elusive. For example, Google
Flu Trends, a web system based on [16], opened to great fanfare but proved to
be inaccurate in many situations [25] and shut down in the summer of 2015 [11].
The field has also encountered difficulty answering criticisms from the public
health community on how it deals with demographic bias, media coverage of
outbreaks, high noise levels, and other issues. Because the field’s successes are
based on observational studies in specific contexts, it is hard to know how robust
or generalizable these approaches are or what unsuccessful alternatives remain
unpublished.
This paper argues that a necessary part of the solution is a mathematical model
of the disease surveillance information flow. We offer such a model, describing
both internet-based and traditional disease surveillance as a Shannon commu-
nication [37] (Figure 1). This lets us discuss the two approaches with unified
vocabulary and mathematics. In particular, we show that they face similar chal-
lenges, but these challenges manifest and are addressed differently. For example,
both face concept drift [12]: Google search volume is sometimes, but not always,
predictive of influenza incidence (Figure 2), and traditional estimates of autism
spectrum disorder are impacted by changing interpretations of changing case
definitions [40] (Figure 3).
Using this model, we introduce a new quality metric, deceptiveness, in order to
quantify how much a surveillance system risks giving the right answer for the
wrong reasons, i.e., to put a number on “past performance is no guarantee of
future results”. For example, basketball-related web searches correlate with some
influenza seasons, and are thus predictive of flu, but should not be included in
flu estimation models because this correlation is a coincidence [16].
This approach lets us do three things. First, we show that neither approach
is perfect nor has fully addressed its challenges. Second, we show that the two
1One review of this body of research is our previous work [32].
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Figure 1: Schematic diagram of disease surveillance as a Shannon communication,
patterned after Figure 1 of [37] and using the notation in this paper. This formulation
lets one compare any two disease surveillance approaches with unified vocabulary and
apply the rich tools of information theory.
approaches are complementary; internet-based disease surveillance can add value
to but not replace traditional surveillance. Finally, we identify specific improve-
ments that internet-based surveillance can make, in order to become a trusted
complement, and show how such improvements can be quantified.
In the body of this paper, we first describe a general mapping of disease surveil-
lance to the components of Shannon communication, along with its challenges
and evaluation metrics in terms of this mapping. We then cover the same three
aspects of traditional and internet-based surveillance more specifically. We close
with a future research agenda in light of this description.
2 Disease surveillance in general
Many aspects of traditional and internet-based disease surveillance are similar.
This section lays out the bulk of our model in common and highlights the aspects
that will be treated specifically later. We first describe disease surveillance as
a Shannon communication, then use these concepts to discuss the challenges of
surveillance and metrics to assess performance.
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Figure 2: Google Trends U.S. search volume [18] for query string “flu” fitted to U.S.
influenza-like-illness (ILI) data [6]. The plot shows that search volume fails to track
ILI early in the season, perhaps due to vaccination publicity schedules, demonstrating
concept drift. We call this query deceptive during these periods.
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Figure 3: Prevalence of autism spectrum disorder as reported by parents has increased
by a factor of 30 between 1997 and 2015 in a survey-based traditional surveillance
approach [29, 40], but actual prevalence probably has not [40]. This plot shows drift
both gradually as parental interpretations of diagnostic criteria change over time and
suddenly when diagnostic criteria were revised.
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Figure 4: Example population of 25 people and how information about this popu-
lation’s disease status flows to public health decision makers. By traditional means
(top flow), incidence information is encoded by the assignment of people to providers,
added to noise introduced by the health care system, and decoded by a weighted
average. By internet-based means (bottom flow), information is encoded and made
noisy by Wikipedia use and decoded by a statistical model. (Note that encyclopedia
article visits resulting from infection observations contain both signal and random
noise, as illustrated by the extra visit to “Influenza” and the missed visit to “Fever”.)
Because quantitative internet-based surveillance needs reference data for training, it
both depends on and reflects problems in traditional surveillance
2.1 As a Shannon communication
Our model of disease surveillance as a Shannon communication is illustrated
in schematic form in Figure 1 and as an example population in Figure 4. This
section walks through the key Shannon concepts and vocabulary, detailing how
they fit a disease surveillance process.
The information source is a real-world phenomenon with a quantitative property
we want to measure over some sequence of time intervals. Specifically, we assume
that for each interval v, there exists a well-defined quantity of interest (QOI) wv.
In our disease surveillance context, we might ask, of United States residents
(information source), what fraction become infected with influenza (QOI) during
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each week of the flu season (interval):2
wv =
people newly infected during v
total population at risk
(1)
Each wv comprises one symbol, and the message W is the sequence of all wv;
i.e., W = {w1, w2, ..., w|V |}. Here, W comprises the true, unobservable epidemic
curve [30] that public health professionals strive for.
Next, each symbol is transformed by an encoder function to its corresponding
encoded symbol, Uv(wv). This transformation is distributed, so Uv is not a scalar
quantity but rather a set of sub-symbols uvi:
Uv(wv) = {uv1(wv), uv2(wv), . . . , uv|U |(wv)} (2)
(Note that when clear from context, we use unadorned function names like Uv and
uv to refer to their output, not the function itself, with the argument implied.)
For traditional disease surveillance, the encoder is the partitioning of the pop-
ulation at risk into sub-populations. For example, uvi might be the fraction of
people served by clinic i who became infected during interval v.
For internet-based surveillance, the encoder is an internet system along with
its users. Individuals with health concerns search, click links, write messages,
and create other activity traces related to their health status or observations.
For example, uvi might be the noise-free number of web searches for query i
motivated by observations of infection.
Both types of disease surveillance are noisy. Thus, Uv is unobservable by the
decoder. Instead, the received symbol at each interval is a set Xv of noisy features:
xvi(wv) = uvi(wv) + δvi + εvi (3)
Xv(wv) = {xv1(wv), xv2(wv), . . . , xv|U |(wv)} (4)
Each observable feature xvi is composed of unobservable signal uvi, systematic
noise δvi, and random noise εvi.
For traditional disease surveillance, the noise source is the front-line health care
system along with individuals’ choices on whether to engage with this system.
For example, there is random variation in whether an individual chooses to
seek care and systematically varying influence on those choices. Also, diagnostic
criteria can be over- or under-inclusive, and providers make both random and
systematic diagnosis errors. Considering these and other influences, xvi might
be the fraction of individuals visiting clinic i who are diagnosed positive during
2This is known as incidence. An alternate measure is prevalence, which is the number of
active infections at any given time and which may be more observable by laypeople. Despite
this, we illustrate our model with incidence because it is more commonly used by public health
professionals. The two are roughly interchangeable unless the interval duration is considerably
shorter than the typical duration of infection.
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interval v, which is not the same as the fraction of individuals in sub-population
i who become infected.
For internet-based surveillance, both the noise source and the encoder are in
the internet system and its users. For example, whether a given individual with
health observations makes a given search contains random variation and system-
atic biases; also, health-related articles are visited by individuals for non-health
reasons. Technical effects such as caching also affect the data. xvi might be the
number of number of searches for query i, which is different than the number
of searches for query i motivated by observations of infection and unaffected by
noise.
The decoder function wˆv(Xv) transforms the received symbol into an estimate of
the QOI. For traditional disease surveillance, this is typically a weighted average
of xvi; for internet-based surveillance, it is a statistical model trained against
available traditional surveillance estimates, which lag real time.
Further details of encoding, noise, and decoding are specific to the different
surveillance methods and will be explored below.
Finally, the destination of the communication is the people who act on the
knowledge contained in wˆv, in our case those who make public health decisions,
such as public health professionals and elected or appointed leadership.
The problem is that wˆv 6= wv for both traditional and internet surveillance. This
leads to the questions why and by how much, which we address next.
2.2 Challenges
QOI estimates wˆv are inaccurate for specific reasons.
3 Feature i might be non-
useful because (a) uvi(Xv) is too small, (b) δvi is too large, (c) the function uvi
is changing, and/or (d) δvi is changing. These problems can be exacerbated by
model misspecification, e.g. if the “true” relationship is quadratic but a linear
model is used; we assume a reasonably appropriate model. The following sub-
sections describe these four challenges.
2.2.1 uvi(Xv) too small: Signal to noise ratio
Disease surveillance can miss useful information because the signal uvi is too
small: either it does not exist (uvi = 0) or is swamped by noise (uvi  δvi + εvi).
3This ontology of errors is related to that of survey statistics, which classifies on two
dimensions [24]. Sampling error is random when the whole population is not observed and
systematic when the selected sample is non-representative (selection bias). Non-sampling error
is everything else, such as measurement and transcription error, and can also be random or
systematic.
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For example, many diseases have high rates of asymptomatic infection; about
half of influenza cases have no symptoms [4]. Asymptomatic infections are hard
to measure because they do not motivate internet traces and infected individuals
do not seek care. Thus, correction factors tend to be uncertain, particularly for
specific outbreaks.
An example of the latter is diseases that have low incidence but are well-known
and interesting to the public, such as rabies, which had two U.S. cases in 2013 [1].
These diseases tend to produce many internet activity traces, but few are related
to actual infections.
2.2.2 δvi too large: Static sample bias
The populations sampled by disease surveillance differ from the population at
large in systematic ways. For example, those who seek care at clinics, and are
thus available to traditional surveillance, tend to be sicker than the general
population [19], and internet systems invariably have different demographics
than the general population [10].
This problem increases systematic noise δvi for a given feature i by the same
amount in each interval v.
2.2.3 uvi changing: Encoding drift
The encoder function can change over time, i.e., uvi 6= uti for different intervals
v 6= t. For example, internet systems often grow rapidly; this increases the
number of available observers, in turn increasing the average number of traces
per infection.
This is a form of concept drift and reduces estimate accuracy when models
erroneously assume function uvi = uti.
2.2.4 δvi changing: Sample bias drift
Systematic noise can also change over time, i.e., δvi 6= δti. A commonly cited
cause is the “Oprah Effect” (named after the American television personality
and businesswoman Oprah Winfrey), where public interest in an outbreak rises
due to media coverage, in turn driving an increase in internet activity related
to this coverage rather than disease incidence [3]. Traditional surveillance can
have similar problems, dubbed the “Jolie Effect”; some scholars believe actress
Angelina Jolie’s well-publicized preemptive mastectomy caused a significant
change in the population of women seeking breast cancer-related genetic tests [9].
This is another form of concept drift and reduces estimate accuracy when models
erroneously assume δvi = δti.
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Some phenomena can be a mix of the two types of drift. For example, internet
systems actively manipulate activity [25], such as Google’s search recommen-
dations that update live while a query is being typed [17]. This can lead users
to create disease-related activity traces they might not have otherwise, whether
motivated by an observed infection (encoding drift) or not (sample bias drift).
2.3 Accuracy metrics
Epidemiologists evaluate disease surveillance systems on a variety of qualitative
and quantitative dimensions [38]. One of these is accuracy: how close is the
estimated incidence to the true value? This can be considered from two perspec-
tives. Error is the difference between the estimated and true QOI values, while
deceptiveness is the fraction of an estimate that is based on coincidental rather
than informative evidence. The latter is important because it quantifies the risk
that future applications of a model will give less accurate estimates. This section
defines the two metrics.
2.3.1 Error
We quantify error E in the usual way, as the difference between the QOI and its
estimate:
Ev = wˆv − wv (5)
Perfectly accurate estimates yield Ev = 0, overestimates Ev > 0, and underesti-
mates Ev < 0. Importantly, Ev is unobservable, because wv is unobservable.
As we discuss below, traditional surveillance acknowledges that Ev 6= 0 but its
methods often assume Ev = 0, and this finds its way into internet surveillance
via the latter’s training.
2.3.2 Deceptiveness
Our second metric, deceptiveness, addresses the issue that an estimate can be
accurate for the wrong reasons. A deceptive search query is illustrated in Figure 2.
Another example for internet-based surveillance is the sport of basketball, whose
season of play roughly coincides with the flu season. A na¨ıve model can notice
this correlation and build a decoder that uses basketball-related activity traces
to accurately estimate flu incidence. Philosophers might say this model has a
justified true belief — it has a correct, evidence-based assessment of the flu —
but this belief is not knowledge because it is not based on relevant evidence,
creating a Gettier problem [14]. This flu model relies on a coincidental, rather
than real, relationship [16]. We call such a model, based on deceptive features,
also deceptive.
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We quantify the deceptiveness of both disease incidence estimates and individual
features for both specific intervals and the analysis period as a whole. For a
specific interval, deceptiveness is the fraction of the feature or estimate’s value
that is the result of noise, and the deceptiveness for the analysis period as a whole
is the maximum of any interval (or some other suitable aggregation function).
Specifically, the deceptiveness of a specific feature i at interval v is:4
gvi =
|δvi|+ |εvi|
|uvi|+ |δvi|+ |εvi| ∈ [0, 1] (6)
One can also define systematic and random deceptiveness gs and gr if the two
types of noise should be considered separately.
We summarize the deceptiveness of a feature by its maximum deceptiveness over
all intervals:
gi = max
v
(gvi) (7)
The deceptiveness of a complete estimate or model depends on the decoder
function wˆ, because a decoder that is better able to exclude noise (e.g., by giving
deceptive features small coefficients) will reduce the deceptiveness of its estimates.
Thus, we partition wˆ into functions that depend on signal wˆs, systematic noise
wˆns, and random noise wˆnr:
∆v = {δv1, δv2, ..., δv|U |} (8)
Ev = {εv1, εv2, ..., εv|U |} (9)
wˆv(Xv) = wˆ
s
v(Uv) + wˆ
ns
v (∆v) + wˆ
nr
v (Ev) (10)
The deceptiveness of an estimate G is therefore:
Gv =
|wˆnsv (∆v)|+ |wˆnrv (Ev)|
|wˆsv(Uv)|+ |wˆnsv (∆v)|+ |wˆnrv (Ev)|
∈ [0, 1] (11)
G = max
v
(Gv) (12)
A deceptive feature is an example of a spurious relationship. These typically
arise due to omitted variable bias: there is some confounding variable (e.g., day
of year) that jointly influences both a deceptive feature and the QOI, creating a
model mis-specification [2]. Corrections include adding confounds to the model
as control variables and data de-trending. These effects can be captured by our
approach in wˆns and wˆnr.
Like error, deceptiveness is unobservable, and more pernicious because quan-
tifying it relies on the causality of the relationship between a feature and the
QOI. This makes it easy and tempting to discount. Further, being a measure of
4This formulation ignores the fact that a feature can have multiple, offsetting sources of
noise. One could correct this problem by summing the absolute value of each noise source
independently. In general, the definition of g should be adapted to specific applications.
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risk, estimating it from past data requires care because relevant future outcomes
cannot be incorporated. However, as we discuss below, additional information
such as semantic relatedness can help with such estimates.
We turn next to a specific analysis of traditional disease surveillance as a Shannon
communication.
3 Traditional disease surveillance
Traditional disease surveillance is based on in-person gathering of clinical or
laboratory data. These data feed into a reporting chain that aggregates them
and computes the corresponding QOI estimates.
This section completes the Shannon model for traditional surveillance by detail-
ing the encoding, noise, and decoding steps. We then explore the implications
of this model for the surveillance challenges and accuracy metrics.
3.1 Shannon communication model
As a concrete example to illustrate the encoding and decoding components
of the traditional surveillance communication, we use the United States’ sea-
sonal influenza reporting system, ILInet, because it is one of the most fea-
tureful traditional surveillance systems. ILInet produces incidence estimates of
influenza-like-illness (ILI): symptoms consistent with influenza that lack a non-
flu explanation [5]. Other well-known surveillance systems include the European
Surveillance System (TESSy) [31], the Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance
Network (FoodNet) [20], and the United States’ arboviral surveillance system
(ArboNET) [27].
Data for ILInet is collected at roughly 2,800 voluntarily reporting sentinel
provider clinics [5]. During each one-week interval, reporting providers count
(a) the total number of patients seen and (b) the number of patients diagnosed
with ILI. These numbers are aggregated via state health departments and the
CDC to produce the published ILI estimates.
This procedure suggests a hierarchical partition of the population at risk, as
illustrated in Figure 5. The observable sets are:
• Pv : All members of the population at risk.
• P vv : People who visit a sentinel provider.
• P nvv : People who do not visit a sentinel provider.
• P dv : People who visit a provider and meet the surveillance criteria, in this
case because they are diagnosed with ILI.
• P ndv : People who visit a provider but do not meet the surveillance criteria.
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Figure 5: Hierarchical partition of the population at risk P into sets whose size is
observable or not by traditional disease surveillance. This illustrates the mismatch
between the information available to traditional surveillance and the quantity it is
trying to measure.
The sizes of these sets are observable: |Pv| from census data; |P vv |, |P dv |, and
|P ndv | from provider reports; and |P nvv | = |Pv| − |P vv | by subtraction.
These sets are defined by provider visits and diagnosis, which is not the same as
infection status. Thus, each is further partitioned into two unobservable subsets:
those who acquire a flu infection during interval v and those who do not (though
they may have an active infection acquired during a previous interval). We denote
these with superscript + and − respectively, e.g., Pv = P+v ∪P−v ; P+v ∩P−v = ∅.
We add a final, orthogonal partitioning into |U | sub-populations served by
provider i. For example, the members of sub-population i who visited a sen-
tinel provider during interval v and met the surveillance criteria comprise P dvi.
Each individual is a member of exactly one sub-population, and we assume for
simplicity that members of sub-population i visit either provider i or none at
all.5
We can now model the encoding function that creates vector Xv. Recall that
the symbol that we wish to encode is the fraction of the population at risk that
5How individuals select providers does not affect our exposition. Real-world selections are
typically driven by geography, socioeconomic status, demographics, and insurance.
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became infected during the interval:
wv =
|P+v |
|Pv| (13)
|P+v | = |P d+v |+ |P nd+v |+ |P nv+v | (14)
This can be partitioned by sub-population i:
uvi(wv) =
|P+vi |
|Pvi| (15)
βi =
|Pvi|
|Pv| (16)
wv =
|U |∑
i=1
βiuvi (17)
Note that wv is defined in terms of infection status. On the other hand, surveil-
lance can observe only whether someone visits a sentinel provider and whether
they are diagnosed with the surveillance criteria. Each feature xvi ∈ Xv is the
fraction of patients visiting provider i who are diagnosed:6
xvi =
|P dvi|
|P vvi|
(18)
Decoding to produce the estimate wˆv is accomplished as in Equation 17, using
the population-derived β as above:7
wˆ(Xv) =
|U |∑
i=1
βixvi (19)
In short, the traditional surveillance communication is purpose-built to col-
lect only disease-relevant information and thus couples with a simple decoder.
Nonetheless, this communication does face the challenges enumerated above and
is not noise-free. This we address next.
3.2 Challenges
This section details the four challenges outlined above in the context of traditional
surveillance. The key issue is sample bias, both static and dynamic.
6In reality, providers report the numerator and denominator of xvi separately, but we omit
this detail for simplicity.
7This corresponds to the ILInet product weighted ILI, which weights by state population.
A second product, plain ILI, gives each reporting provider equal weight. For simplicity, this
paper uses unadorned ILI to refer to weighted ILI.
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3.2.1 Signal to noise ratio
Traditional surveillance generally does not have meaningful problems with signal
to noise ratio. While there are noise sources, as discussed below, these tend to
be a nuisance rather than a cause of misleading conclusions.
This is due largely to the purpose-built nature of the surveillance system, which
works hard to measure only what is of interest. To avoid missing cases of impor-
tant rare diseases, where signal to noise ratio is of greatest concern, monitoring
is more focused. For example, any provider who sees a case of rabies must report
it [1], in contrast to ILInet, which captures only a sample of seasonal flu cases.
3.2.2 Static sample bias
Patient populations (P v) differ systematically from the general population (P ).
For example, patients in the Veteran Health Administration tend to be sicker
and older than the general population [19], and traditional influenza systems
tend to over-represent severe cases that are more common in children and the
elderly [35].
Sampling bias can in principle be mitigated by adjusting measurement weights
to account for the ways in which the populations differ, for example by age [35],
triage score [35], and geography [5]. This, however, requires quantitative knowl-
edge of the difference, which is not always available or accurate.
ILInet uses the number of sites that report each week, state-specific baselines,
and age [5]. For influenza, age is particularly important for mitigating sample
bias, because severity and attack rate differ widely between age groups [35].
3.2.3 Encoding drift
In our model, traditional surveillance is immune to encoding drift because the
encoder functions contain only wv (Equation 15); there are no other parameters
to effect drift.
3.2.4 Sample bias drift
Traditional surveillance is designed to be consistent over time, but it does not
reach this goal perfectly and is not immune to drifting sample bias.
One source of drift is that case definitions change. Figure 3 illustrates this for
autism spectrum disorder, and the definition of ILI has also varied over time [23].
Another is that individuals’ decisions on whether to seek care drift; for example,
media coverage of an outbreak [34] or a celebrity editorial [9] can affect these
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decisions. These and others do not affect the newly infected and non-newly-
infected equally, so the sample bias and associated systematic noise changes.
This suggests that traditional surveillance might be improved by better address-
ing sample bias. Bias could be reduced by sampling those not seeking care, e.g.,
by random telephone surveys of the general population for flu symptoms, and it
could be better corrected with improved static and dynamic bias models.
3.3 Accuracy
Traditional surveillance features include patients not newly infected (P d−vi ⊂ P dvi)
and exclude people who are newly infected but receive a negative diagnosis or do
not visit a sentinel provider (P nd+vi ∩P dvi = ∅ and P nv+vi ∩P vvi = ∅, respectively).
Causes include lack of symptoms, diagnosis errors by individual or provider, and
access problems. That is:
xvi =
|P dvi|
|P vvi|
6= |P
+
vi |
|Pvi| = uvi (20)
In practice, this problem is addressed by essentially assuming it away. That
is, consumers of traditional surveillance assume that the fraction of patients
diagnosed with the surveillance criteria does in fact equal the new infection rate
among the general population:
|P dvi|
|P vvi|
=
|P+vi |
|Pvi| (21)
xvi = uvi (22)
Some recent work extends this to assume that the quantities are proportional,
independent of v [36, e.g.].
Epidemiologists know this assumption is dubious. They are careful to refer to
“ILI” rather than “influenza”, do not claim that ILI is equal to incidence, and
give more consideration to changes over time rather than specific estimate values.
Under these caveats, the measure serves well the direct goals of surveillance, such
as understanding when an outbreak will peak and its severity relative to past
outbreaks [5].
Both error and deceptiveness in traditional surveillance depend on noise. This
can be quantified by rewriting Equation 18:
xvi = uvi +
|P dvi|
|P vvi|
− |P
+
vi |
|Pvi| (23)
δvi + εvi =
|P dvi|
|P vvi|
− |P
+
vi |
|Pvi| (24)
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As one might expect, the noise in feature xvi is the difference between the fraction
of clinic-visiting, diagnosed patients and the fraction of the general population
newly infected.
One challenge is separating the noise into systematic and random components.
For example, if a newly infected person chooses to seek care, how much of that
decision is random chance and how much is systematic bias? The present work
does not address this, but one can imagine additional parameters to quantify
this distinction.
3.3.1 Error
Recall that error is the difference between the true QOI and its estimate:
Ev = wˆv − |P
+
v |
|Pv| (25)
The unobservable ratio
|P+v |
|Pv| can be estimated, but with difficulty, because one
must test the entire population, not just those who seek care or are symptomatic.
One way to do this is a sero-prevalence study, which looks for antibodies in
the blood of all members of a population; this provides direct evidence of past
infection rates [15].
The adjustments discussed above in §3.2 also reduce error by improving wˆv.
3.3.2 Deceptiveness
One can write the deceptiveness of a specific feature as follows:
gvi =
∣∣∣ |Pdvi||P vvi| − uvi∣∣∣
uvi +
∣∣∣ |Pdvi||P vvi| − uvi∣∣∣ (26)
Note that because we only know δvi and εvi as a sum, we must use |δvi+εvi| rather
than |δvi|+ |εvi|, making the metric less robust against offsetting systematic and
random error.
This again depends on an unobservable ratio, meaning that in practice it must
be estimated rather than measured.
wv 6= wˆv in traditional disease surveillance due to unavoidable systematic and
random noise. Nevertheless, it frequently provides high-quality data of great
social value. For example, the distinction between a case of influenza and a case
of non-influenza respiratory disease with flu-like symptoms is often immaterial
to clinical resource allocation and staffing decisions, because the key quantity is
volume of patients rather than which specific organism is at fault. wˆv provides
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this. Thus, traditional surveillance is an example of a situation where the quantity
of interest wv is elusive, but a noisy and biased surrogate wˆv is available and
sufficient for many purposes. Accordingly, traditional surveillance has much in
common with internet-based surveillance, as we next explore.
4 Internet-based disease surveillance
In contrast to traditional surveillance, which is based on data gathered by direct
observation of individual patients, internet-based disease surveillance conjectures
that traces of people’s internet activity can drive a useful incidence estimation
model. Thus, its Shannon communication differs, as do the corresponding impli-
cations for its challenges and accuracy.
4.1 Shannon communication model
Internet-based surveillance leverages found features optimized for unrelated pur-
poses,8 instead of purpose-built ones as in traditional surveillance.
Rather than diagnosis counts made by health care providers, features in internet
surveillance arise by counting defined classes of activity traces; thus, they are
much more numerous. For example, Wikipedia contains 40 million encyclopedia
articles across all its languages [41], versus 2,800 ILInet providers. As a corol-
lary, while traditional features offer useful information by design, internet-based
features are the result of complex guided and emergent human behavior and
thus overwhelmingly non-informative. That is, most internet features provide
no useful information about flu incidence, but a few might. For example, the
number of times the Wikipedia article “Influenza” was requested in a given week
plausibly informs a flu estimate, while “Basketball” and “George H. W. Bush”
do not.
Raw traces such as access log lines are converted into counts, such as the number
of requests for each article, searches for each query string, or n-gram mentions
per unit time. In the case of Wikipedia, xvi ∈ Z ≥ 0 is the number of requests
for Wikipedia article i during interval v.
These trace counts comprise the features. For example, for each new infection
during interval v, some number of requests uvi for every Wikipedia article i is
generated. Added to this signal is systematic noise δvi (article requests made for
other reasons), and random noise εvi (random variation in article traffic). Thus,
the features observable to the decoder are the familiar mix of signal and noise:
xvi = uvi + δvi + εvi. (3)
8For example, looking at illustrations of cats [33].
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Internet features use a different unit than traditional features. For traditional
surveillance, the symbol and feature units are both the person, who has a specific
infection status and can be assigned a positive or negative diagnosis. For internet
surveillance, the unit is activity traces. These include traces of information
seeking activity such as Wikipedia article requests [13] or Google searches [16]
as well as information sharing activity such as n-grams in Twitter messages [8].
This mismatch between feature units (trace counts) and encoded symbol units
(people) is a challenge for internet-based surveillance that is not shared with
traditional surveillance.
Like traditional surveillance, the decoder is a function of the observable data
(features). Often, this is a parameterized model, such as a linear model, that
contains parameters that must be estimated. This is done by fitting the model
against a reference data set, which is usually incidence estimates from a tradi-
tional surveillance system. We denote these reference data as yv. For a linear
model, the fit is set up as:
yv =
|U |∑
i=1
βixvi + β0 + εv (27)
The slopes βi are estimated in two steps. The first is a filter: because including
the very large number of irrelevant internet features in a regression would be noisy
and inefficient, most of them are removed by setting βi = 0. This procedure might
be a context analysis (i.e., all features semantically unrelated to the outbreak
of interest are removed), a correlation analysis (features where the correlation
between y and xi is below a threshold are removed), or something else. The
goal is to greatly reduce the number of features, e.g. from 40 million to tens or
hundreds in the case of Wikipedia, implementing the modelers’ prior belief over
which features are relevant and not deceptive.
Next, β0 and the remaining βi are estimated by fitting the collection of xi to y
using some kind of regression. These estimated coefficients constitute a fitted
model that can be applied to a previously unseen set of features Xt, producing
an estimate of the reference yˆv and in turn the QOI wˆv.
This illustrates how internet-based disease surveillance is inextricably bound to
traditional surveillance. Quantitative statistical estimates require quantitative
reference data, and traditional surveillance in some form is what is available.
Internet surveillance thus inherits many of traditional surveillance’s flaws; for
example, if the reference data are biased, the internet estimates will share this
bias.
However, internet estimates do have important advantages of timeliness and cost
because the information pipeline, once configured, is entirely automated. While
for contexts like U.S. ILI, which has a lag of 1–2 weeks [5], this speed advantage
is modest, in other contexts traditional surveillance lags by months or an entire
season, a critical flaw [22].
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4.2 Challenges
Internet-based disease surveillance faces a new set of challenges derived from its
use of a non-purpose-built encoder.
4.2.1 Signal to noise ratio
This is a significant problem for internet-based surveillance. For example, the
English Wikipedia article “Rabies” was requested 1.6 million times in 2013 [39],
but there were only two U.S. cases that year [1]. Thus, it’s certain that u δ+ε
and plausible that u = 0, making requests for this article a deceptive feature.
This limits the applicability of internet-based surveillance. Outbreaks likely occur
having no features with sufficiently low deceptiveness, making them impossible
to surveil reliably with internet data. This may be true even if fitting yields
a low-error model, because fitting seeks out correlation rather than causality;
recall the basketball problem.
Models can address this by estimating deceptiveness and down-weighting features
with high deceptiveness. Thus, accurately estimating deceptiveness is important.
We explore this further below.
4.2.2 Static sample bias
Internet surveillance suffers from sample bias in multiple ways. First, disease-
related activity traces in a given internet system reflect people’s responses to the
real world, including reflections of their own health status or that of people they
observe (who are likely to be similar to them). Internet use varies systematically
based on factors related to health status, such as age and other demographics;
in turn, activity traces vary systematically by those same factors. For example,
social media tends to be modestly skewed on most demographic variables studied,
including gender, age, race, education, income, and urban/rural [10].
Second, the unit mismatch between the message (people) and signal (trace counts)
can increase this bias. For example, one might hypothesize that a younger person
with respiratory symptoms might post more messages about the situation than
an older person with the same symptoms. If this is systematically true, then the
the number of activity traces is additionally biased on top of the user bias noted
above. This opportunity for bias is not shared with traditional surveillance.
However, the fitting process compensates for these biases. For example, if men are
overrepresented among a systems’ users and this is evident in their activity traces,
the gendered traces will be down-weighted, correcting for the overrepresentation.
Thus, the resulting estimates will be roughly as biased as the reference data.
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4.2.3 Encoding drift
This issue can be a problem for internet surveillance, because the assumption
that uvi = uti for all intervals v and t (Equation 27) is false. For example,
modern search sites use positive feedback: as more people search for flu, the
system notices and offers more suggestions to search for flu [25], thus increasing
the number of searches per infection.
Models can address this by incorporating more realistic assumptions about how
u changes over time, for example that it varies smoothly.
4.2.4 Sample bias drift
This is perhaps the most pernicious problem for internet surveillance. That is,
the assumption that δvi = δti ∀ v, t (also Equation 27) is simply false, sometimes
very much so. Causes can include gradual user and activity pattern drift over
time as well as sudden “Oprah Effect” shifts.
Models can address this by treating δ over time more realistically. Opportunities
include explicit model terms such as smooth variation, leveraging deceptiveness
estimates to exclude deceptive features, and including data sources to estimate
current sample bias, though taking advantage of such opportunities well may be
challenging.
We argue that in order for any internet-based surveillance proposal to be credible,
it must address signal-to-noise ratio and drift issues using careful, quantitative,
and application-aware methods. On the other hand, static sample bias can be ad-
dressed by simply following best practices. We propose some assessment options
in the next section.
4.3 Accuracy
Error for internet-based models can be easily computed against the reference
data y, but because the QOI w is not observable even after the passage of
time, true error is not observable either. This has two consequences. First, any
imperfections in the traditional surveillance are not evident in the error metric;
thus, it is prudent to evaluate against multiple reference data. Second, simulation
studies where w is known are important for properly evaluating a proposed
approach.
Deceptiveness adds an additional problem: it depends not only on the quantita-
tive relationship between features and the QOI but their causal relationship as
well. This makes it fundamentally unknowable, even with perfect reference data.
However, the situation is not quite so grim, as proxies are often available. For ex-
ample, our previous work showed that limiting Wikipedia models to semantically
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Figure 6: Alternatives to the deceptive feature in Figure 2 [6, 18]. These examples
show that additional information can sometimes be used to reduce deceptiveness in
internet features. At top, expert knowledge about the patterns of seasonal flu is used
to identify and remove the deceptive period, replacing it with a linear interpolation.
At bottom, Google’s proprietary machine learning algorithms are used to identify and
count searches likely related to the disease, rather than occurrences of a raw search
string.
related articles reduced error [32]. Models can also reduce risk by monitoring
carefully for the breakdown in coincidental correlation that makes deceptive fea-
tures troublesome. Our point is not that the situation is hopeless but that that
effective internet-based models must grapple quantitatively with deceptiveness.
We argue that doing so successfully is plausible; compare the features in Figure 6
to the one in Figure 2. Properly designed internet-based surveillance might be
almost as accurate as traditional surveillance but available faster, providing
similar value in a more nimble, and thus actionable, fashion.
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5 Discussion
Traditional disease surveillance is not perfect. It has problems with static sample
bias and, to a lesser degree, drifting bias. These are consequences of the fact that
traditional surveillance can only gather information from people in contact with
the health care system. Thus, expanding access to health care, outreach, and
further work on compensating for these biases can improve incidence estimates
produced by traditional surveillance.
Internet-based surveillance is not perfect either. In addition to inheriting most of
the problems of traditional surveillance, with which it is necessarily entangled for
training data, it adds signal-to-noise problems, further sample bias issues, and
further drift as a consequence of its found encoder. Yet because it is inexpensive
and more timely, it holds great promise. So what is to be done? We propose
three things.
1. Because deceptiveness matters, model features should be selected that have
both high correlation with reference data (to drive good predictions) and
low deceptiveness (to reduce the risk of including coincidentally predic-
tive features). Existing data fitting techniques address the first part, and
we recommend adding a deceptiveness estimation step using additional
information such as semantic relatedness.
2. Because past model performance by itself is not predictive of future per-
formance, model proposals should also include an analytical argument
supporting their performance. One approach is to (a) define application-
appropriate bounds on acceptable estimate error and deceptiveness, (b) de-
rive the properties of input features necessary to meet those bounds, and
(c) show that input features with those properties are available.
3. Because performance metrics include quantities unobservable in the real
world, no model should be evaluated only on real data. Models should also
be evaluated on simulated disease outbreaks, which do not replicate the
real world in every detail but are valid tools for understanding [26], where
all quantities are known.
Internet-based disease surveillance cannot replace traditional surveillance, but it
can be an important complement because it is faster and cheaper with broader
reach. By better understanding the deficiencies of both along with their common-
alities and relationship, using the tools proposed above, we can build quantitative
arguments describing the added value of internet-based surveillance in specific
situations. Only then can it be relied on for life-and-death public health deci-
sions [13].
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